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Abstract
In todays Internet, online content and especially webpages have increased expo-
nentially. Alongside this huge rise, the number of users has also amplified consid-
erably in the past two decades. Most responsible institutions such as banks and
governments follow specific rules and regulations regarding conducts and security.
But, most websites are designed and developed using little restrictions on these
issues. That is why it is important to protect users from harmful webpages. Pre-
vious research has looked at to detect harmful webpages, by running the machine
learning models on a remote website. The problem with this approach is that the
detection rate is slow, because of the need to handle large number of webpages.
There is a gap in knowledge to research into which machine learning algorithms
are capable of detecting harmful web applications in real time on a local machine.
The conventional method of detecting malicious webpages is going through
the black list and checking whether the webpages are listed. Black list is a
list of webpages which are classified as malicious from a user’s point of view.
These black lists are created by trusted organisations and volunteers. They are
then used by modern web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer,
etc. However, black list is ineffective because of the frequent-changing nature
of webpages, growing numbers of webpages that pose scalability issues and the
crawlers’ inability to visit intranet webpages that require computer operators to
login as authenticated users.
The thesis proposes to use various machine learning algorithms, both super-
vised and unsupervised to categorise webpages based on parsing their features
such as content (which played the most important role in this thesis), URL infor-
mation, URL links and screenshots of webpages. The features were then converted
to a format understandable by machine learning algorithms which analysed these
features to make one important decision: whether a given webpage is malicious
or not, using commonly available software and hardware. Prototype tools were
developed to compare and analyse the efficiency of these machine learning tech-
niques. These techniques include supervised algorithms such as Support Vector
Machine, Na¨ıve Bayes, Random Forest, Linear Discriminant Analysis, Quantita-
tive Discriminant Analysis and Decision Tree. The unsupervised techniques are
Self-Organising Map, Affinity Propagation and K-Means. Self-Organising Map
was used instead of Neural Networks and the research suggests that the new
version of Neural Network i.e. Deep Learning would be great for this research.
The supervised algorithms performed better than the unsupervised algorithms
and the best out of all these techniques is SVM that achieves 98% accuracy. The
result was validated by the Chrome extension which used the classifier in real
time. Unsupervised algorithms came close to supervised algorithms. This is
surprising given the fact that they do not have access to the class information
beforehand.
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1.1. Background and related work 23
1.1 Background and related work
When the World Wide Web started, there was not an immediate need to improve
the security of webpages. Web developers and designers focused on textual infor-
mation and did not make huge use of graphics, JavaScript files or stylesheets. If
the first Google search page [9] is taken as an example, it had very few features.
This allowed the Google search page to load faster over a slow Internet connec-
tion. With the rise of broadband speed, users started to spend more time online.
They started visiting more websites and the businesses took advantage of this
phenomenon by providing more information and services online. Government or-
ganisations too provided information online and allowed access to information 24
hours a day. Users, instead of visiting places physically, could now visit webpages
and got the information they wanted. This trend continued, and will continue to
grow, unless any radical transformation in information access takes place.
Due to the open nature of the Internet, there are no vetting processes and
individuals accessing various webpages have to rely on blacklists to determine
whether a webpage is malicious or not. This thesis provides an alternative method
using machine learning techniques to make this judgement without the help of a
blacklist.
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Security threats are increasing day by day and are very common [10]. Take for
example online payments. The payment processing capabilities allow customers
to carry out transactions online. Banks collaborate with businesses and provide
facilities so that their customers can pay for products online. Many malicous
websites take advantage of this and pose as ‘genuine websites’. Users think that
the websites are legitimate and provide personal information to buy products.
For example emails are sent to a user from the websites and the user thinks that
they were sent from legitimate businesses. These email have links to a malicious
webpage. The user clicks the link, visits the malicious webpage created by the
malicious attacker, which looks exactly like the bank’s webpage. The user tries
to log in but cannot. But in the meantime the malicious attacker gets hold of the
username and password which it then uses to get hold of the original account.
Modern browsers have a new way to secure themselves. They look at publicly
available blacklists of malicious webpages. These blacklists are updated after a
few days or a month. The problem is that the blacklists do not safeguard the
sudden changes within a webpage. Although the web crawler visits the webpages
every few days, the websites are capable of causing damages within a short a
period of time i.e. within those few days. At this point, users will already get
affected, because the browser thought of it as a secure webpage and accessed
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it, because it was not in the black list. On the other hand, a webpage may be
hacked and injected with malicious code visible only to some particular users or
a group of users from an organisation or a country. The blacklists will not be
able to blacklist those either. Some crawlers do not validate the JavaScript code
because JavaScript executes only in a browser. This allows client vulnerabilities
to pass through easily. Even though some of the scripts which are assumed
to be safe, but they can load remote malicious scripts and then execute them
on the computer. Some scripts create iFrames and then load external malicious
webpages. These external webpages get hold of the cookies and steal the identity.
The users then browse this malicious webpage, get their computers infected and
are then easily tracked by remote users from elsewhere. The users may also
run malicious executable files without even knowing that the executable file has
already access to the system.
Apart from the server side attacks, there are also client side attacks that
can only be detected within a browser itself. These client side attacks can be
categorised into the cross site scripting, clickjacking and download by attacks.
These three attacks are described in the next sections.
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1.2 Cross Site Scripting
1.2.1 Introduction
Cross site scripting injects malicious code from unexpected sources and causes
various problems for the user [11]. This malicious code can get hold of the cook-
ies, browsing history and then sends them over to the malicious webpage. There
have been many attempts to prevent these sort of attacks [12]. It not only af-
fects the user but also affects the server. The webpage is used as the vehicle to
transfer infections to multiple users. The malicious code then executes in the
user’s browser. The problem has been intensified with the addition of scripting
capabilities that did not exist at the initial stages of the Internet. With the ad-
dition of scripting capabilities, the users enjoy better user experience but have
now become prone to these additional security problems. These scripts can run
on the client’s browser as they do not execute on the web server. Even if the
web developer has built the webpage only using HTML, an attacker can inject
scripts to make it susceptible to scripts. These scripts can then get access to the
authentication cookies.
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1.2.2 Affects
The XSS vulnerability affects the users as well the webpages hosting the webpage
[11]. For example, a user visits a webpage and decides to buy from the webpage.
The user adds the items to the basket and wants to checkout. Then he fills in
a form to register. Each of these users are uniquely identifiable by the webpage
through the use of cookies. The malicious attacker will be able to look at the
cookies and impersonate the users and thus buy products, without the knowledge
of the users.
1.2.3 Types of XSS attacks
There are various types of XSS attacks out of which three are tackled in this
thesis. The first is reflection based attacks that take place with emails or Twitter
and Facebook messages containing links to the malicious webpage [11]. This link
directs the users to a malicious form that submits information to the attackers
webpage and thus the attacker gets access to the user cookies which are used
as identification mechanisms. The second is DOM Attack, i.e. attack based on
document object model where an attacker inserts script tags into the webpage.
This script tag has a source tag that links to the attacker’s webpage. Or the
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script in the JavaScript code writes something on the form based on the URL
on the webpage. In the third type of attack, malicious code is stored on the web
server which has been used as a target by the attacker.
1.2.4 Problems for the web administrators
Apart from the fact that the above incident anger users, the webpage owner too
faces technical issues. For example, if the administrator of an e-commerce website
browses the website for testing purposes, the attacker can get hold of the cookies
of the administrator, log in to the backend and manage products. They can add,
edit or reduce the prices of the products. When someone suspects that something
is wrong is with the e-commerce website, the administrators will look at the logs
only to find that the malicious activities were carried out by no other than the
administrator.
1.2.5 Administrator access
To avoid the above scenario, the administrator should not access the webpage
from a publicly available webpage to make sure that there are no contacts with
the malicious scripts [13]. This is very hard to implement and there should be
policies to enforce it. One way to do it, is to allow access to the administrators
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only from a certain location or URL, which will be unknown to public. Also the
IP address of that URL will also be blocked from external users. The firewall have
to be set up properly so that this does not happen. The basic assumption is that
the attacker will not be aware of how to even access as an administrator, even
if the malicious attacker gets access to the administrator cookies. But there are
ways to hide the actual IP address and replace with a fake IP address (in this case
the valid IP address that has access to the administrator section). The attacker
will obviously not have the response from the webpage but the purpose to inject
the webpage with malicious code can be successful. But if the administrators have
access to the public webpage, they can deploy a local version can be deployed
to a machine within a secure environment. So that even if the local version is
injected with malicious code the attacker will not be able to take any advantage.
1.2.6 DOM based attacks
Almost all HTML tags are wrapped by either ‘greater than’ and ‘less than’. To
inject the script tag, these two characters are needed. Several combination of
characters can generate > [1]. The combinations of letters that generate the
letters are dependent on browser version and the default language. The combi-
nations are quite vast (see Figure 1.1). A browser cannot be trusted because of
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Figure 1.1: Values for <[1].
these extensive possibilities and some precautions are suggested one of which is
to encode the data entered by the user and the data displayed to the user. This
is known as sanitisation. In terms of how the webpage is deployed to the user,
the operations team have to make sure that the firewall or any other forms of
preventative measures are kept up to date.
Apart from the server side prevention techniques, the users can prevent them-
selves from the XSS attacks by disabling the JavaScript. This would have been
acceptable at the beginning of the Internet when scripting were hardly in use.
But these days when scripting is essential, the appropriate approach would be
to detect the malicious XSS code and then stop it from executing. Kirda and
Jovonovic [14] have provided a client side solution to this problem. This was
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built as a windows application which allows a user to use it as a personal web
firewall i.e. not dependent on the web developers or the security. Not only it has
minimal user intervention, it also stops access to session and cookies which are
the main targets for XSS attackers. The firewall looks at each of the incoming
and outgoing connections and decides whether the connections are safe. It looks
at the referrer header, POST requests and also tries to mitigate advanced XSS
attacks.
1.3 Clickjacking
Another security threat that is difficult to detect is clickjacking [15]. This is a
relatively new threat that has become more prominent with the advancement of
modern browsers. Clickjacking does not not use security vulnerabilities, rather it
uses the browsers’ most common feature i.e. hyperlinks. The user is encouraged
to click a link to a page. But this particular webpage has two webpages one which
is displayed to the user and the other i.e the malicious page is hidden from the
user. The hidden webpage executes malicious the code even though the user will
think that the information is on the correct webpage. This technique is very hard
to detect by inspecting the source code and there have not been many successful
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Figure 1.2: Clickjacking shows a displayed page and a hidden page [2].
ways to prevent it from happening. There are two techniques that are used to
hide the hidden page. The first technique is to make the hidden page transparent
using the CSS display property, which is set to none. The second technique
places the object behind the original page using the CSS z-index property. The
z-index property is set to the lowest value so that it stays behind all the time.
This hidden webpage has hyperlinks behind the original hyperlinks. The position
of these hyperlinks are exactly the same. So, when a user clicks the hyperlink
displayed on the webpage, the user actually clicks the hyperlink on the hidden
webpage. Just like the cross site scripting technique this click inject malicious
code into the webpage. Similar to XSS attacks the clickjacking technique can be
prevented by using NoScript. But this hinders the user experience and so is not
a pragmatic approach. Figure 1.2 shows an example of clickjacking.
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1.3.1 Types of clickjacking
There are various types of clickjacking out of which three are discussed in this
thesis. The first method of clickjacking launches a small window via JavaScript
and the user remains unaware of it. In the second method, the link executes a
search via a search engine and also sends the query to the attacker’s webpage.
And in the third method, the link sends a new cookie to the web browsers and
to steal the cookie. The third method which is a harder option, is to implement
clickjacking on someone else’s webpage. Such a webpage are likely to be already
popular as the attacker will want the users to visit the webpage and click the
hyperlinks. But if the webpage is already infected, the webpage will have a
hidden page with hyperlinks behind the displayed page. If such a a webpage
is affected, the web administrator will be able to detect assuming that regular
checks are carried out.
Clickjacking are also spread by email messages that support HTML format.
The displayed email will have hyperlinks with the malicious hyperlinks behind
the main hyperlinks. This will allow the attacker to carry out the same damage
to a user similar who downloads a malicious executable. The users may also
get infected because malicious JavaScript which get hold of cookies allow the
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attacker to impersonate the user (similar to the XSS example). The users may
also get infected by accepting a cookie from the attackers webpage and thus will
be traceable by the attacker.
1.3.2 Preventative measures
The easiest method to prevent clickjacking is to look at the status bar of the
browser before clicking any links [12]. If the hyperlink looks suspicious, then the
user should not click the link. The problem with this method is that the user
may not know this. Depending on the implementation of the hidden page, the
user may look at the source code and then decide whether the page is malicious
or not. If the hidden page is behind the displayed page, the users will not be
able to see the hidden page’s source code. Otherwise, they can see the source
code of the displayed page. Another option is to use text based browsers which
do not execute any scripts on the browser. Thus the user will be safe from any
attacks. This may not be the best option because the webpage nowadays are
more than likely to use scripts and therefore will be dysfunctional in the text
browser. Although HTML parsers can correctly see the HTML to track iframe,
display or opacity property, these tags are used extensively in many webpages,
thus triggering an alarm based on the existence of these, defeats the purpose. One
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suggestion is to create a plugin for the browser to detect the number of clickable
objects overlapping within an iframe and an z-index [2]. But the technique is not
full proof in HTML5 browsers which has sandboxing properties that allows to
avoid the barrier. This sandboxing attribute is present in iframes in the HTML5
specification [2].
1.4 Drive by downloads
Drive by download occurs when a file downloads on a user’s PC without the
knowledge of the user [16, 17]. This malicious executable then installs itself on
the user’s computer. This is a popular method which has been used by [18]
to spread malware infection on the Internet. It uses three components in its
attack: the web server, the browser and the malware. An attacker finds a web
server to serve the malware. The webpage exploits any incoming user. These
exploits use code to execute commands on the user’s browser. The web server
provides the malware which the browser downloads. The targeted browser has
a known vulnerability that the attacker exploits. Internet Explorer had many
instances of ActiveX loopholes that the attackers had used and are still using.
There are some potential solutions to these problems [18]. The first solution is to
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completely isolate the browser from the operating system so that any arbitrary
code are not at all executed on the browser. Another solution is for web crawlers
to visit webpage and see whether they are hosting any malware content. But
the attackers can avoid this by using a URL that does not have a corresponding
hyperlink. Crawlers by its nature only visits URLs that have a corresponding
hyperlink.
1.5 Novel features
With wide ranging new threats that appear every day, attackers will devise new
ways to avoid barriers raised by administrators and web developers. For improved
security, an automated tool is ever more important to detect the vulnerabilities.
One alternative approach to this automated approach is for web developers to
secure and enhance their webpages. But there is only a certain extent that a
developer can secure to secure a webpage. Web developers are bound by the web
frameworks they use [17, 19, 20]. If the web frameworks fail to take preventative
measures, the users’ machines get infected and the webpages become vulnerable.
This thesis takes the research further by applying several supervised machine
learning techniques such as Na¨ıve bayes Classifier, K-Nearest Neighbour, Random
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Forest, Support Vector Machine, Linear Discriminant Analysis and Quadratic
Discriminant Analysis and three unsupervised machine learning techniques like
SOM, K-Means and Affinity Propagation. Moreover, the novel unsupervised
techniques of K-means and Affinity Propagation have not been applied to detect
malicious webpages by any other researchers in the past. The research uses a
combination of both supervised and unsupervised techniques to further improve
the efficiency of models.
1.6 Contributions
The aim of this thesis is to detect malicious webpages through machine learning
and the contributions (listed below) provide a clear pathway to meet it.
• Provide an different approach to blacklists to predict whether webpages are
safe, by analysing webpage content and other features in real time using
machine learning techniques.
• Speed up the execution time of the learning process of the machine learning
techniques by taking advantage of multiple computers.
• Create a mechanism to build Chrome browser extensions that can commu-
nicate with models from a local computer.
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1.7 Organisation
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the security problems faced by modern web-
pages and also gives an overview of the current methods to tackle malicious web-
pages using machine learning techniques. Chapter 3 describes a method to repre-
Figure 1.3: Organisation for Chapters
sent webpages in a form that is understandable by the machine learning models.
Chapter 4 provides the results of the simulations carried out using the supervised
machine learning techniques which include Support Vector Machine, K-Nearest
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Neighbour, Latent Discriminant Analysis, Quadratic Discriminant Analysis, De-
cision tree and Random Forest. Chapter 5 provides results of the simulations
carried out using the unsupervised machine learning techniques. This include the
K-means, Self-organising map and Affinity Propagation. Chapter 6 discusses the
findings from the supervised and unsupervised techniques and provides sugges-
tions for future work. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.
CHAPTER 2
Overview of machine learning algorithms
and their usage to detect malicious
webpages
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2.1 Introduction
With wide ranging threats that are appearing each day, attackers will devise new
ways to avoid barriers raised by administrators and web developers. For improved
security, the security within a browser and the server needs to maintain safety
through an automated tool that will learn to detect the vulnerabilities. One
alternative approach to this automated approach is for web developers to secure
and enhance their websites themselves. But there is only a certain extent that a
developer can work to secure a webpage. Web developers are bound by the web
frameworks [19] they use. If the frameworks fail to take preventative measures,
the users’ machines get infected, the webpages become vulnerable. With the
expected rise of devices that access the Internet, it is now critical to improve the
security of webpages.
Machine learning has seen itself being used in many places. A simple view
of the machine learning process is that given a training set of data, the model
trains itself and then when the new sets of data are passed on to it, it predicts the
result. Recent improvements in hardware (especially in CPU and in GPU [21])
performance seen the use of machine learning increase by manifolds. Take for
example, the detection of malicious webpages. The security companies are trying
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to make use of such models and have seen some success. On the other hand,
malicious attackers are increasing in strength and are looking for any chance to
combat with new exploits. The problems are likely to rise in the future and new
methods will have to be developed to tackle this rising phenomenon.
One of the ways this problem of malicious webpages could be resolved is
through the use of client side detection methods. These methods are not very
efficient, because the client machine may not be fast enough and the amount of
computation required may not be enough. There are two types of classification
that are used to detect malicious webpages. One is lightweight [22] and another
is full fledged classification [23]. Full fledged classification involves many fea-
tures e.g. host information, WHOIS, URL structure, mysterious characters in
the dataset etc. The lightweight classification process use less features. This al-
lows the lightweight algorithm to run faster because of less computation. But the
disadvantage is that the detection rate is not as good as the full fledged implemen-
tation. Some researchers argue that the lightweight ones should be used on the
client as they are quite capable of detectin malicious webpages to a satisfactory
level [24, 25].
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2.2 Previous work in this domain
Kin and Thi [26] carried out one of the first work that used machine learning to
detect malicious webpages. This work ignored webpage content and looked at
URLs using a bag-of-words representation of tokens in the URL with annotations
about the tokens’ positions within the URL. The noteworthy result from this
work is that lexical features can achieve 95% of the accuracy of page content
features. Garera’s work [27] used logistic regression over 18 hand-selected features
to classify phishing URLs. The features include the presence of red flag key words
in the URL, features based on Google’s page rank, and Google’s webpage quality
guidelines. They achieve a classification accuracy of 97.3% over a set of 2,500
URLs. Though this thesis has similar motivation and methodology, it differs
by trying to detect all types of malicious activities. It also uses more data for
training and testing. Spertus [28] suggested an alternative approach and looked
at identifying malicious webpages and Cohen [29] has used the decision trees
for detection and Dumais et al. [30] has used inductive learning algorithms and
representations for text categorisation. This thesis has used similar techniques
but applied them to webpages which have more complex structures. Guan et al
[31] focused on classifying URLs that appear in webpages. Several URL-based
2.2. Previous work in this domain 44
features were used such as webpage timing and content. But this thesis has used
more features with better accuracy. Mcgrath and Gupta [32] did not construct
a classifier but nevertheless performed a comparative analysis of phishing and
non-phishing URLs. With respect to the data sets, they compare non-phishing
URLs drawn from the DMOZ Open Directory Project to phishing URLs from a
non-public source. The features they analyse include IP addresses, WHOIS thin
records (containing date and registrar-provided information only), geographic
information, and lexical features of the URL (length, character distribution, and
presence of predefined brand names). The difference to this thesis is the use of
different types of features i.e. content, screenshots, url and visual features of
webpages. These features affect whether a webpage is malicious or not. Prvos et
al. [33] performed a study of drive-by exploit URLs and used a patented machine
learning algorithm as a pre-filter for virtual machine (VM) based analysis. This
approach is based on heavyweight classifiers and is time consuming. Provos et.
al [33] used the following features in computer simulation content based features
from the page, whether inline frames are ‘out of place’, the presence of obfuscated
JavaScript, and finally whether iFrames point to known exploit websites. Please
note, an ‘IFrame’ is a window within a page that can contain another page. In
their evaluations, the ML-based pre filter can achieve 0.1% false positives and
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10% false negatives. This approach is very different to this thesis as the features
are very primarily focused on iFrames. Bannur et al.’s [34] research is most similar
to this thesis but it uses a very small dataset and this thesis uses other types of
visual features.
2.3 Problems of using machine learning to op-
timise security of webpages
Current machine learning techniques that are being used to detect malicious
webpages have yet to progress to deal with the complexity of learning problems
because the majority of the research efforts in machine learning applications have
concentrated on supervised algorithms. Malicious webpages are characterised
with a large amount of evolving dynamic information. This evolving information
requires feature selection/extraction, not only to reduce the dimensionality for
machine learning, but also to capture the evolving characteristics. To discover
the evolving patterns in data, machine learning techniques have to be combined
into feature selection. New machine learning techniques and feature selection
techniques are required to identify continuous behaviour in data.
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2.4 Reasons for model representation
Applying machine learning techniques to web content requires them to be under-
standable to probabilistic reasoning. Initially, various natural language webpage
representations were considered from the computational linguistics community
[35]. Such representations used to address problems such as the part-of-speech
tagging and they are not useful for the types of clustering and classification prob-
lems that will be looked at in this work. Rather, a vector space representation
of web content has been used. In this representation, web content are cast as
vectors in a very high dimensional space. Since probabilistic models can be com-
putationally expensive to apply and may lack robustness in spaces with high di-
mensionality, some simple initial methods for dimensionality reduction has been
examined in Chapter 3.
2.5 Machine learning techniques
The features found in each webpage are used to create very high dimensional fea-
ture vectors. Most of the features are generated by the “bag-of-words” representa-
tion of the URL, page links, content and visual features. The high dimensionality
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of these feature vectors poses certain challenges for classification. Though only
a subset of the generated features may correlate with malicious webpages, it is
not possible to know which features are relevant in advance. More generally,
when there are more features than labeled examples, there are possibilities that
statistical models will be susceptible to over-fitting.
In this section, the discussion takes place on machine learning techniques
that will be used for classification. Though individual classifiers differ in their
details, the same basic protocol applies to all the models that are considered.
The classifiers are trained on labeled examples to learn a decision rule that can
ultimately be applied to unlabelled examples. Given an input x, the trained
classifiers return a real-valued output h(x) that sets a limit to obtain a binary
prediction. The reason why this thesis uses binary prediction is to make it easier
for a user to make a quick decision as to whether a webpage is malicious or not.
2.6 Supervised machine learning techniques
2.6.1 Support Vector Machine
SVM (see Figure 2.2) is widely regarded as one of the excellent models for bi-
nary classification of high dimensional data [36]. SVM and any other supervised
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Figure 2.1: Supervised architecture for classifying webpages
classifiers use a similar technique to classify webpages as is shown in Figure 4.1.
SVM is modelled as
y(x) =
N∑
n=1
λntnx
Txn + w0 (2.1)
The sign of this distance indicates the side of the decision boundary on which the
example lies. The value of y(x) is limited to predict a binary label for the feature
vector x. The model is trained by first specifying a kernel function K(x, x′)
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Figure 2.2: An example of Support Vector Machine classification where the soft
margin classifier learned with C = 5/16, at which point x is about to become a
support vector. On the right the soft margin classifier has learned with C = 1/10
all examples contribute equally to the weight vector. The asterisks denote the
class means, and the decision boundary is parallel to the one learned by the basic
linear classifier [3].
(this thesis uses RBF and linear kernels) and then computing the coefficients
αi that maximise the margin of correct classification on the training set. The
required optimisation can be formulated as an instance of quadratic programming,
a problem for which many efficient solvers have been developed [37].
2.6.2 Na¨ıve bayes
Na¨ıve bayes (see Figure 2.3) are mostly used in spam filters [38] and it as-
sumes that, for a given label, the individual features of URLs are distributed
independently of the values of other features [39]. Letting P (x|y) denote the
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Figure 2.3: An example of Na¨ıve Bayes classification [4]. The left picture shows
a plot of two class data where a new sample represented by the solid triangle, is
being predicted. On the right the conditional density plots of predictor A created
using a nonparametric density estimate. The value of predictor A for the new
sample is shown by the vertical black line.
conditional probability of the feature vector given its label, the model assumes
P (x|y) = ∏dj=1 P (xj|y). To calculate the conditional probability the thesis uses
a product of the probability densities for each individual predictor.
By using Bayes rules it is assumed that malicious and safe webpages occur
with equal probability. The posterior probability is computed so that the feature
vector x belongs to a malicious webpage as:
P (y = 1|x) = P (x|y = 1)
P (x|y = 1) + P (x|y = 0) (2.2)
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Finally, the right hand side of Equation 2.2 can be thresholded to predict a
binary label for the feature vector x. The Na¨ıve bayes classifier is trained by
computing the conditional probabilities P (xj|y) from their maximum likelihood
estimates [39]. For real-valued features, P (xj|y) is modelled by a Gaussian distri-
bution whose mean and standard deviation are computed over the jth component
of feature vectors in the training set with label y. For binary valued features,
P (xj = 1|y) is estimated as the fraction of feature vectors in the training set
with label y for which the jth component is one. The model parameters in the
Na¨ıve bayes classifier are estimated to maximise the joint log-likelihood of URL
features and labels, as opposed to the accuracy of classification. Optimising the
latter typically leads to more accurate classifiers, notwithstanding the increased
risk of over-fitting.
2.6.3 Decision Trees
A Decision Tree (see Figure 2.4 for an example) uses a tree-like graph or model
of decisions and their possible outcomes [40].
Decision Tree is a flow-chart like structure. The internal node represents
test on an attribute, each branch represents outcome of test and each leaf node
represents class label [41]. Classification rules are represented by paths from roots
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Figure 2.4: A leaf labeled as (n1, n0) means that there are n1 positive examples
that match this path, and n0 negative examples. Most of the leaves are “pure”,
meaning they only have examples of one class or the other; the only exception
is leaf representing red ellipses, which has a label distribution of (1, 1). Positive
distinguishes from negative red ellipses by adding a further test based on size.
However, it is not always desirable to construct trees that perfectly model the
training data, due to overfitting [5].
to the leaves.
2.6.4 Random Forest
Random Forests (see Figure 2.5) are an ensemble learning method for classifica-
tion (and regression) that operates by constructing a multitude of decision trees
during training time. The algorithm for inducing a Random Forest was developed
by Leo Breiman and Adele Cutler [42]. The term came from random decision
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forests that was first proposed by Tin Kam Ho of Bell Labs in 1995 [43].
Figure 2.5: An ensemble of five basic linear classifiers built from bootstrap sam-
ples with bagging. The decision rule is majority vote, leading to a piecewise
linear decision boundary. On the right if the votes are turned into probabilities,
it is seen that the ensemble is effectively a grouping model: each instance space
segment obtains a slightly different probability [3].
2.6.5 Quadratic Discriminant Analysis
Quadratic Discriminant Analysis or QDA (see Figure 2.6) assumes that the mea-
surements from each class are normally distributed [44]. QDA does not assume
that the covariance of each of the classes is identical. Likelihood ratio test is used
when the normality assumption is true.
2.6.6 Linear Discriminant Analysis
Linear Discriminant Analysis or LDA (see Figure 2.7) finds a linear combination
of features which characterises or separates two or more classes of objects or
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Figure 2.6: Linear decision boundaries using Quadratic Discriminant Analysis for
the 2 and 3 class case shows that the two clusters are now separate [5].
events. The resulting combination may be used as a linear classifier or to reduce
dimensions before later classification [45].
Figure 2.7: Linear decision boundaries using Linear Discriminant Analysis for the
2 and 3 class case shows that the two clusters are now separate [5].
LDA works when the measurements made on independent variables for each
observation are continuous quantities [46, 47].
2.6. Supervised machine learning techniques 55
2.6.7 K-Nearest Neighbour
K-Nearest Neighbour (see Figure 2.8) classifies the label of a new point xˆ with
the most frequent label tˆ of the k nearest training instances [48]. It is modelled
Figure 2.8: The nearest neighbour decision boundary separates the two classes.
tˆ = arg max C
∑
i:xi∈Nk(x,xˆ)
δ(ti,C) (2.3)
where:
• Nk(x, xˆ)← k points in x closest to xˆ
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• Euclidean distance formula:
√∑D
i=1(xi − xˆi)2
• δ(a, b)← 1 if a = b; 0 o/w
The model does not require any optimization and it trains itself using cross
validation to learn the appropriate k. k regularizes the classifier, as k → N
the boundary becomes smoother. O(NM) is used as space complexity, since all
training instances and all their features need to be kept in memory. K-Nearest
neighbor uses a very simple technique for classification, and cannot handle large
training dataset as shown in the results section.
2.7 Unsupervised machine learning techniques
So far, the discussion has focused on supervised machine learning techniques.
This section focuses on the unsupervised machine learning techniques where the
class information is not available beforehand.
2.7.1 Affinity Propagation
Affinity Propagation (see Figures 2.9 and 2.10) is an unsupervised machine learn-
ing technique created by Frey and Dueck [49] where each data point acts as cen-
troids. These data points choose the number of clusters. The following represent
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the centroid for datapoint i
ci ∈ {1, ..., N} (2.4)
The goal is to maximise the following function
S(c) =
N∑
i=1
s(i, ci) =
N∑
k=1
δk(c) (2.5)
The similarity of each point to the centroid is measured by the first term in and
the second term is a penalty term denoted as −∞. If some data point i has chosen
k as its exemplar that is ck 6= k, but k has not chosen itself as an exemplar i.e.
ck = k, then the following constraints could be presented.
δk(c)(c) =
N∑
i=1
s(i, ci) =
N∑
k=1
δk(c) (2.6)
δk(c) =

−∞ if ck 6= k but ∃ici = k
0 otherwise
(2.7)
A factor graph can represent the objective function and it is possible to use
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Figure 2.9: Affinity Propagation Factor Graphs for Affinity Propagation. Circles
are variables, squares are factors. Each node has N possible states. [5].
Figure 2.10: Example of Affinity Propagation. Each point is colored coded by
how much it wants to be an exemplar. This can be computed by summing up all
the incoming availability messages and the self-similarity term. The darkness of
the ik arrow reflects how much point i wants to belong to exemplar k [5].
N nodes, each with N possible values or with N2 binary nodes. Each variable
node ci sends a message to each feature node δk and each factor node δk sends
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a message to each variable node ci. The number of clusters is controllable by
scaling the diagonal term S(i, i), which shows how much each data point would
like to be an exemplar. Affinity Propagation has been developed very recently i.e.
in 2009 and it has a very good performance as shown later in the results section.
2.7.2 Self-Organising Map
A SOM (see Figure 2.11) consists of a fixed lattice (typically 2-dimensional) of
processing elements. Each processing element has an associated (initially ran-
dom) prototype vector. In a SOM different parts of the Neural Network respond
similarly to certain input patterns. The weights of the neurons in the SOM
are set to either to small random values or sampled evenly from the subspace
spanned by the two largest principal component eigenvectors. The SOM is then
fed by a large number of example vectors that represent, as close as possible,
the kinds of vectors expected during mapping [50]. The examples are usually
administered several times. The training utilises competitive learning. When a
training example is fed to the network, its Euclidean distance to all weight vectors
is computed. The neuron with weight vector most similar to the input is called
the best matching unit (BMU). The weights of the BMU and neurons close to it
in the SOM lattice are adjusted towards the input vector. The magnitude of the
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Figure 2.11: SOM architecture shows the input nodes (on the left) which do
no computation, and the weights are modified to change the activations of the
neurons. However, the nodes with the SOM affect each other in that the winning
node also changes the weights of neurons that are close to it [6].
change decreases with time and with distance from the BMU.
2.7.3 K-Means
K-Means (see Figure 2.12) is a hard-margin, geometric clustering algorithm,
where each data point is assigned to its closest centroid [51]. It is modelled
using hard assignments rnk ∈ {0, 1} s.t. ∀n
∑
k rnk = 1, i.e. each data point is as-
signed to one cluster k. The geometric distance is calculated using the Euclidean
distance, l2 norm:
||xn − µk||2 =
√√√√ D∑
i=1
(xni − µki)2 (2.8)
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Figure 2.12: A single layer Neural Network can implement the K-Means solution.
[6]
where:
• µk is cluster centroid
• D is the no of points
• x is the one of the points.
The Mini-Batch K-Means algorithm uses mini batches to reduce the computation
time while still attempting to optimise the same objective function [52]. Mini-
batches are subsets of the input data, randomly sampled in each training iteration.
These mini-batches drastically reduce the amount of computation required to
converge to a local solution. In contrast to other algorithms that reduce the
convergence times of K-Means, Mini Batch K-Means produces results. Mini batch
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K-Means converges faster than K-Means, but the quality of the results is reduced.
In practice, the difference in quality can be quite small, as shown later.
2.8 Online learning
Online learning algorithms solve online classification problem over a sequence of
pairs that are generally represented by a feature vector and a label [53]. After
predicting, the algorithm receive the actual label and record the error rate. The
algorithm then predicts the hypothesis for the next time step. The models are
presented in order of increasing complexity with respect to the objective functions
and the treatment of the classification margin. Whenever there are mistakes, the
classical algorithm updates its weight vectors. Because the update rule is fixed,
the model cannot account for the severity of the misclassification. As a result, the
algorithm can overcompensate for mistakes in some cases and under compensate
in other cases.
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2.9 Gaps in the current state of research and
the approach of this thesis
Other work that detect malicious webpages using machine learning techniques are
focused either on blacklists [33] or URL information [8] or content or execution
trace. Moreover, other work have focused on a single or up to few features at
most, but this thesis uses contents, URLs, links and screenshots from webpages
which allow to understand the webpages in a comprehensive manner. It also
looks at using unsupervised machine learning techniques and tries to improve the
performance of the classifiers by using multiple machines.
2.10 Summary
This Chapter looked at the machine learning techniques used in the thesis. These
techniques are used in Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 5 the SOM technique was
improved using multicore machines whereas in Chapter 4 the techniques were
improved using a combination of features. The incorporation of web content
opens various areas to explore. Up to this point, other work have used linear
classification because it scales easily to large scale problems. However, content
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contains high level structure and semantics that are potentially useful.
With the knowledge gained through this literature review process, the thesis,
in the next Chapter, describes the features used in the simulation and provides
a comprehensive framework that converts webpages into a format readable by
machine learning models.
CHAPTER 3
Representation of web content for
machine learning techniques
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Computing is not about computers any more. It is about living.
Figure 3.1: Text from the first webpage
The hire charge is computed on a daily basis.
Figure 3.2: Text from the second webpage
3.1 Vector space representation
Data mining problems generally use the vector space to represent web content
[54]. Each webpage either uses a Boolean or a numerical vector where each
dimension in the vector corresponds to a distinct term in the webpage content. A
given webpage has in each component a numerical value specifying some function
f of how often the term corresponding to the dimension appears in the webpage.
By varying the function f , alternative term weightings [55] can be produced. A
term is a sequence of alpha numeric characters which is separated either by white
space or tabs or newline characters or punctuation marks. Also, all upper case
letters in a webpage are converted to lower-case to ignore capitalisation. Figures
3.1and 3.2 shows example webpages. The first webpage contains a famous quote
from Nicholas Negroponte.
Table 3.1 shows the results of parsing these two webpages into single-word
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Term Vector for webpage 1 Vector for webpage 2
a 0 1
about 2 0
any 1 0
basis 0 1
charge 0 1
computed 0 1
computers 1 0
computing 1 0
daily 0 1
hire 0 1
is 2 1
it 1 0
living 1 0
more 1 0
no 0 1
not 1 0
on 0 1
the 0 1
Table 3.1: A simple vector representation of the sample webpages
terms, and then representing them as vectors with simple term frequencies (i.e.,
term counts) in each component. Such a representation is known as a bag of
words [56], since the relative position of terms in the webpage, and hence the
language structure, is not recorded in the resulting vectors.
In this thesis, the terms that defined the dimensions of the vector space are
word stems. For example, the words “computed”, “computers” and “computing”
would be converted to ‘comput”. Porter [57] has developed a popular algorithm
for word stemming and this algorithm has been incorporated into WAC’s HTML
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Comput is not about comput ani more It is about liv.
Figure 3.3: Stemmed text from the first webpage
The hire charg is comput on a daili basi
Figure 3.4: Stemmed text from the second webpage
parser (WAC is the name of the tool developed for this thesis). The two sample
webpages presented earlier would look like if the contents were stemmed using
Porter’s stemming algorithm. Table 3.2 shows the vector representation of the
stemmed version of the webpages. Stemming may be useful to help reduce similar
terms in most cases but in other cases the results of stemming can be counter
productive. Frakes [58] compared various stemming methods to unstemmed rep-
resentations and showed that both representations perform equally in many cases.
Some researchers have defined the dimensions of a vector space with multi
word phrases such as “Prime Minister David Cameron” and “personal computer”.
These multi-words appear frequently as sequences of words [59], or by apply-
ing NLP to detect meaningful phrases [60] or manually look for specific phrases
[28, 61]. Going back to stemming, previous results using multi-word terms are
mixed. Some researchers report that using terms can help improve accuracy
for classification tasks [29] whereas others have found them to be as effective as
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Term Vector for webpage 1 Vector for webpage 2
a 0 1
about 2 0
ani 1 0
basi 0 1
charg 0 1
comput 2 1
daili 0 1
hire 0 1
it 1 0
is 2 1
liv 1 0
more 1 0
not 1 0
on 0 1
the 0 1
Table 3.2: A vector representation of the stemmed version of the stemmed web-
pages
single-word terms [30].
3.2 Frequency based vectors
This thesis uses frequency based vectors where ξ(ti, d) denotes the number of
occurrences of term ti in webpage d. The function f can be applied to ξ(ti, d)
and produce the value for the i-th component of the vector for webpage d. The
identity function f(α) = α is applied to the term counts [62]. Other common
functions applied to terms were defined by [63, 64, 65]. But TFIDF is probably the
most popular function applied to webpages. This function uses term frequencies
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(TF) in each webpage used as part of the weighting function alongside the inverse
webpage frequency (IDF) of each term in the entire collection. IDF is usually
defined as
IDF(t) = log(
N
n
), (3.1)
where N is the total number of webpages in the collection and Nt is the number
of webpages in which term t appears at least once. The TFIDF weight for a term
t in a webpage d is the product of the term frequency and the inverse webpages
frequency for that term, returning:
TFIDF(t, d) = ξ(t, d).IDF(t). (3.2)
.
3.3 Alternative representations
Although TFIDF weighting has been used in the part primarily for retrieval, con-
nections between this weighting scheme and probabilistic classification using the
na¨ıve bayes algorithm have been recently explored [66]. Parametric distribution
such as bounded Gaussian or Poisson distribution can capture the probability of
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words appearing different numbers of times in webpages [67, 68]. Alternatively,
a simple Boolean representation of webpages can be used, that records whether
or not a given term appears in a webpage. In this case, the following are found
f(n) =

1 α > 1
0 otherwise
(3.3)
Most rule-base methods [29, 69] use a underlying Boolean model, as the an-
tecedents of the classification rules only considers word presence and absence in
webpages. Boolean vector representation has also been used in probabilistic clas-
sification models [70]. Although it may look like a bad approach, sometimes it
has its uses in various applications. Neither the parametric distribution of the
Boolean representations have been used in the thesis though.
3.4 Reduce dimensionality
The World Wide Web is one of the most diversified environments filled with
content. To deduce vector space representations from this content would be a
humongous task. This problem asks for a solution that is scalable and reduc-
ing dimensionality is one that has been used extensively by many researchers.
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One way to tackle it is to look at English Literature where many words such
as prepositions, conjunctions and pronouns provide structure in language rather
than content. These words can thus be removed from the vectors. Words listed
in [71] can also be removed. Where there are common words that appear once or
twice among webpages play insignificant role and can also be removed [72].
3.5 Features
3.5.1 Webpage content
The semantic features included the TFIDF vectors which were derived from the
webpages and the whole process has been described in Sections 3.1 - 3.4 in detail.
In summary, the webpages have all their HTML tags removed, then the stop
words were removed and then the remaining text were used in the simulations.
3.5.2 URLs
URLs identify webpages and have been used in the thesis as unique identifiers.
Many malicious webpages have suspicious looking characters in their URLs and
in their contents. Sometimes the URLs have spelling mistakes too. The lexical
features of URLs were fed into the machine learning techniques. If there were
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spelling mistakes or suspicious characters in the URL, then they were regarded
as suspicious.
3.5.3 Webpage links
Webpages have many links that give out further information e.g. webpages that
link to malicious webpages are likely to be malicious. The simulations extracted
all the links from each webpage and they were fed into the models too.
3.5.4 Visual features
All the features that have been mentioned so far are text based e.g. source code,
stripped HTML, domain names, URL etc. A complimentary feature was the
use of image based features. First, screenshots of webpages were downloaded
by passing the URLs to PhantomJS (a headless webkit browser with JavaScript
API). It took each URL, saved a screenshot of the webpage and converted them to
PNG file format. Images were then converted to a format understandable by the
models. There are two popular techniques that are generally used i.e. Speeded Up
Robust Features (SURF) and Scale Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT) [73]. The
simulation used SURF because it had less stringent licensing options compared
to SIFT [74]. The idea is that malicious webpages will look similar because are
3.6. Summary 74
likely to be have less input from designers whereas safe webpages will have better
designs.
3.6 Summary
In this Chapter a framework has been built to extract various features from
webpages to feed into the models. The features include content, source code,
URLs and visual features from webpages which were extracted using crawlers
and parsers. This framework lays foundation for the next two Chapters where
various machine learning techniques (both supervised and unsupervised) use these
features.
CHAPTER 4
Computer simulation results using
supervised models to detect malicious
webpages
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Figure 4.1: Architecture for classifying webpages using supervised techniques
4.1 Introduction
This Chapter focuses on the supervised models and discusses the results from
these models. These models are popular in text classification.
Chapter 3 mentioned that this thesis used the bag of words approach, due
to its simplicity and to avoid computational complexity. Figure 4.1 shows how
supervised models have been used to classify the webpages. It is very similar to
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unsupervised models but the only difference is in the training phase, where the
labels are used to train it.
4.2 Results
Figure 4.2 shows the architecture of the tool that carried out the simulation for
this thesis. The simulation was carried out on a machine running on Intel Xeon
E3-1220 CPU with 4 Cores each having a speed of 3.1 GHz. The machine had 12
GB of RAM. First, 100,000 webpages were downloaded using a crawler based on
gevent which uses libevent [75]. Out of these, 70% were used in training and the
rest i.e. 30% were used in test. These downloaded webpages were then converted
into feature vectors. Then a tool named Web Application Classifier (WAC) took
these vectors as inputs, used the machine learning algorithms described in the
previous section to create the predictive models. These predictive models read
vectors of the new webpages to produce an output that indicated whether a
webpage is safe or not. Browsers like Chrome were able to connect to these
predictive models stored inside WAC to indicate whether a webpage is malicious
or not. Chapter 3 described the features that were gathered after the webpages
were preprocessed and cleansed before placing inside the predictive models.
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Figure 4.2: The architecture of Web Application Classifier (WAC)
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4.2.1 Data sources
The downloaded webpages were divided into two sets i.e. malicious and safe. The
source for the list of safe webpages were gathered from primarily from Alexa. The
malicious ones were gathered from various sources primarily from [76]. Two types
of representation of each webpage were created. One contained all the HTML
code and other only had English characters.
4.2.2 Evaluation of the supervised machine learning tech-
niques
It is possible to use each classifier without considering the others. But this can be
potentially misleading in two ways. First, if two classifiers are highly correlated
with the response and with each other, then the univariate approach will iden-
tify both as important. Some models will be negatively impacted by including
this redundant information. Pre-processing approaches such as removing highly
correlated classifiers can alleviate this problem [77]. Second, the univariate impor-
tance approach will fail to identify groups of classifiers that together have a strong
relationship with the response. For example, two classifiers may not be highly
correlated with the response; but, their interaction may be correlated. Univariate
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correlations will not capture this predictive relationship. A good idea would be
to further investigate these aspects of the classifiers instead of using the rankings
as the only method to understand the trends. Knowing which relationship to
look at sometimes requires domain knowledge about the data.
When there are two classes, one approach to use is the area under the ROC
curve [78] to quantify classifier relevance. Here, the classifier data are used as
inputs into the ROC curve. If the classifier could perfectly separate the classes,
there would be a cutoff for the classifier that would achieve a sensitivity and
specificity of 1 and the area under the curve would be one. Figures 4.11, 4.12,
4.13, 4.11, 4.15, 4.14, 4.16, 4.17 and 4.18 show the area under the curve for all
the supervised classifiers.
Machine learning models which were discussed previously were used on differ-
ent combinations of features. First the webpages were classified from just content
features, then other types of features were added and the gain was re-examined.
It was found that the highest accuracy is obtained by combining URL, page-link,
semantic TFIDF and SURF features. This combination of features was used as
the optimal feature configuration. Finally the machine learning techniques were
trained on data sets with varying ratios of malicious and safe webpages. As men-
tioned in earlier, 70% of the labeled webpages were used for training and 30% for
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testing. The ratio of malicious to safe webpages is the same in testing as train-
ing for the supervised machine learning techniques. The supervised classification
performance were evaluated in terms of precision and recall.
4.2.3 Supervised techniques
Figures 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 show visual representations of
webpages which are safe and malicious, after supervised classification was carried
out. There are clear separations between the two types of webpages and the
diagrams illustrate the nature of decision boundaries of various classifiers. The
intuition conveyed by these figures does not resemble the larger datasets. In high-
dimensional spaces, linear classifiers easily separate classes. Table 4.1 shows the
results of the supervised techniques. The accuracy for all the supervised models
improved as the number of webpages increased. Overall, SVM outperformed the
rest. When SVM is considered, the accuracy values for the word-based document
representation are remarkably low in case of a small number of webpages. As
soon as the number of webpages exceeds 500, the accuracy increases. With other
models, a similar trend is observed at the beginning. But then as the number
of webpages increased, the accuracy also increased. The results suggest that the
models were able to generalise better as more patterns emerged from various
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sources.
Figure 4.3: Visual representation of QDA model show clear boundaries between
malicious and safe webpages
Figure 4.4: Visual representation of Linear SVM model show clear boundaries
between malicious and safe webpages
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Figure 4.5: Visual representation of RBF SVM model show clear boundaries
between malicious and safe webpages
Figure 4.6: Visual representation of Nearest Neighbour model show clear bound-
aries between malicious and safe webpages
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Figure 4.7: Visual representation of decision tree model show clear boundaries
between malicious and safe webpages
Figure 4.8: Visual representation of Random Forest model show clear boundaries
between malicious and safe webpages
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Figure 4.9: Visual representation of LDA model show clear boundaries between
malicious and safe webpages
Figure 4.10: Visual representation of QDA model show clear boundaries between
malicious and safe webpages
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Figure 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, 4.11, 4.15, 4.14, 4.16, 4.17 and 4.18 show the Receiver
Optimistic Characteristic of the supervised machine learning techniques and it is
clear that SVM performs the best out of the four. K-Nearest Neighbour performs
the worst, because it had less access to training data due to memory constraints.
The supervised models were also run against one of the most popular datasets
provided by [8]. The data file is SVM based and therefore the data was converted
into recognisable for it for to be fed into the machine learning models. All the
supervised machine learning models scored over 90%. Table 4.2 shows the results
of the simulations.
Figure 4.11: K-Nearest Neighbour’s ROC curve is just above average.
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Figure 4.12: SVM Linear’s ROC curve very close to 1.
Figure 4.13: RBF SVM’s ROC curve is also close to 1.
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Figure 4.14: Na¨ıve Bayes’s ROC curve is just behind the SVM.
Figure 4.15: Random Forest’s ROC curve is just above average.
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Figure 4.16: LDA’s ROC curve is quite close to one.
Figure 4.17: QDA’s ROC curve is average.
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Figure 4.18: Decision Tree’s ROC curve is good.
The previous ROCs do not have cross validation and it is important to see
what effect cross validation can have on the results. Figures 4.19, 4.20, 4.21, 4.19,
4.23, 4.22, 4.24, 4.25 and 4.26 provide ROCs with cross validation. The figures
show that the results are not very different to that without cross validation.
Table 4.1: Results of comparisons of supervised machine learning techniques that
detect malicious webpages
No. of webpages RBF SVM Linear SVM NB KNN RF DT QDA LDA
50 80 79 77 74 77 67 56 58
100 82 83 78 75 77 70 67 67
500 86 92 78 79 77 75 67 68
5000 93 97 84 91 78 77 68 68
100000 93 98 89 95 80 79 68 68
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Figure 4.19: K-Nearest Neighbour’s cross validated ROC curves are just above
average.
Figures 4.27, 4.28, 4.29, 4.27, 4.31, 4.30, 4.32, 4.33 and 4.34 provide confusion
matrices for all the supervised techniques.
4.2.4 Online learning
Online learning uses a different approach than the traditional batch processing
which cannot learn incrementally [79]. The problem tackled in this thesis used
data from an incoming list of malicious webpages and safe webpages. This allowed
the predictive models inside WAC to train automatically as new data came in.
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Figure 4.20: SVM Linear’s cross validated ROC curves are very close to 1.
Figure 4.21: SVM Poly’s cross validated ROC curves is also close to 1.
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Figure 4.22: Na¨ıve Bayes’s cross validated ROC curves are just behind the SVM.
Figure 4.23: Random Forest’s cross validated ROC curve are just above average.
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Figure 4.24: LDA’s cross validated ROC curve are quite close to one.
Figure 4.25: QDA’s cross validated ROC curves are average.
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Figure 4.26: Decision Tree’s cross validated ROC curves are good.
Generally the batch machine learning techniques optimise Equation 4.1.
f(θ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
f(θ, zi) (4.1)
where zi = (xi, yi) in the supervised case and f(θ, zi) is some kind of loss func-
tion. For example, it is possible to use f(θ, zi) = log p(yi|xi,θ) to maximise the
likelihood.
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Figure 4.27: K-Nearest Neighbour’s confusion matrix.
Figure 4.28: Linear SVM’s confusion matrix.
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Figure 4.29: RBF SVM’s confusion matrix.
Figure 4.30: Na¨ıve Bayes’s confusion matrix.
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Figure 4.31: Random Forest’s confusion matrix.
Figure 4.32: LDA’s confusion matrix.
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Figure 4.33: QDA’s confusion matrix.
Figure 4.34: Decision Tree’s confusion matrix.
4.3. Chrome extension 100
4.3 Chrome extension
4.3.1 Introduction
Recent developments in the web browsers allow users to take benefits from various
browser extensions. Unfortunately some of the extensions have been the major
reasons for security issues. But most of the extensions are useful. Chrome exten-
sion are known for their secure environment [80, 81]. There have been research
on Chrome applications extensively [82]. The thesis covered various machine
learning techniques but no implementations for practical case so far has been
presented. This section goes through the details of a Chrome extension that uses
the most successful model of the all the supervised models described before.
4.3.2 Architecture of the Chrome extension
The Chrome extension has been built using the architecture shown in Figure 4.37
using the following steps.
• Step 1: Grab the webpages as soon as the user loads the webpage
• Step 2: Extract the features and then send the features to the predictive
models. The predictive models then send a response
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• Step 3: Content Script notifies the background script with the response
• Step 4: Background script shows the response.
4.3.3 Chrome extension’s user interface
The user interface for the Chrome extension has various options. Figure 4.35
shows the possibilities for the Chrome extension. The first option is to display an
icon in the top right hand corner. The second option is to add the user interface
to the context menu. But this option is not suitable because the user has to
interact only after the webpage has loaded. The last option is to present a user
interface in the Chrome context menu, with an options page, or use a content
script that changes how pages look. This last option involves interaction from
the user and so will take time to give feedback to the user. So the first option is
the most suitable one.
Figure 4.35: The three pictures demonstrates various examples of Chrome exten-
sions [7]
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Figure 4.36: A chrome extension with its various parts and their relationships to
each other[7]
4.3.4 Chrome extension composition
The extension has various files out of which the required files are manifest files
combined with one or more HTML files. Also, there are JavaScript files and image
files. The JavaScript files have code that can determine the functional aspects of
the extension. The image files are needed for the user interface. Before building
and distributing the extension the files mentioned above were then put in a single
folder. A zip program builds a special zip file with a .crx extension. The manifest
file, called manifest.json, stores information about the extension. For examples it
stores the list of important files and lists the capabilities that the extension may
use.
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Table 4.2: Results based on a different dataset provided by [8]
Classifier Accuracy - no. of true positives (%)
Na¨ıve bayes 91
Support Vector Machine (RBF) 97
Support Vector Machine (Linear) 92
K-Nearest Neighbour 85
Decision Tree 86
Random Forest 83
LDA 85
QDA 82
4.3.5 Chrome extension’s architecture
The Chrome extension has a background page which is an invisible page contain-
ing the main logic. If the extension needs to interact with webpages that the
user loads, then the extension uses a content script. Each action of an extension
has a background page (see Figure 4.36) which is defined by background.html
and has JavaScript code that controls the behaviour of the browser action. Ex-
tensions can contain ordinary HTML pages that display the extension’s UI. The
extension interact with webpages via a content script (see Figure 4.36) which is
some JavaScript executing in the context of a loaded page within a web browser.
Content scripts aren’t completely cut off from their parent extensions. A content
script can exchange messages with its parent extension whenever necessary.
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Figure 4.37: The Chrome extension uses 4 steps to decide whether a webpage is
malicious or not.
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Figure 4.38: The Chrome extension shows that the webpage is safe.
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Figure 4.39: The Chrome extension shows that the webpage is malicious.
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4.3.6 Results from the Chrome extension
The content script looks at the loading document and sends the loaded source
code to the predictive classifier. The classifier then parses, creates the features
and then responds with whether it thinks that the webpage is safe or malicious.
The background script receives the response and shows whether it is malicious
(see Figure 4.39) or safe (see Figure 4.38). ‘Heavyweight’ classifiers are more
accurate but has a poor prediction time as they load the same page within their
‘environment’, but use more features and so has a higher accuracy. ‘Lightweight’
classifiers does the opposite i.e. use less features and use the features only avail-
able via the browser. The Chrome extension gets all the features from the browser
and sends them to the classifier which uses more features, thus have a quick pre-
diction time and yet higher accuracy.
4.4 Summary
This Chapter dealt with all the supervised models and have shown that the results
are encouraging. Also, it has been shown that the best performing supervised
model can be used for practical purposes as a Chrome extension. This extension
determined whether a webpage is malicious or not in real time. The next Chapter
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deals with simulations with unsupervised machine learning techniques.
CHAPTER 5
Computer simulation results using
unsupervised machine learning
techniques to detect malicious webpages
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One of the issues that was encountered in the last Chapter (although this was not
mentioned) is the execution time to train the supervised models. This Chapter
initially deals with this particular problem by using MapReduce to improve the
efficiency of an unsupervised machine learning technique i.e. Self-Organising Map
and then uses various other unsupervised machine learning techniques to cluster
webpages.
5.1 SOM
One of the most used algorithm for unsupervised categorisation technique is SOM
[83]. This Chapter makes use of SOM to group webpages into clusters and the
approach is made more effective by eliminating one of its fundamental problems
i.e. slow speed, by using MapReduce programming model [84]. SOM has been
widely used both in the data mining and artificial intelligence community [85, 86].
Although this topic of clustering documents via SOM has been handled in [87] it
was based solely on the users’ navigational behaviour. The most comprehensive
coverage of SOM has been done in [88], but the documents have been journals and
not webpages. Although both journals and webpages are quite similar in content
presentation, there is one fundamental difference i.e. additional HTML tags are
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present in webpages. Therefore, in order to capture or understand the readable
contents from webpages, some special measures are needed i.e. the webpages are
parsed first and the content is chosen from large amounts of HTML tags.
To improve SOM’s speed multiple computers have been used in [89], which
used a Beowulf cluster based on Linux boxes. The time for processing the SOM
reduced to a large extent. But this system is prone to hardware failures. Con-
tinuing from Chapter 2, the update formula for a neuron of a SOM with weight
vector Wv(t) is
Wv(t+ 1) = Wv(t) + Θ(v, t)α(t)(D(t)−Wv(t)) (5.1)
where α(t) is a decreasing learning coefficient and D(t) is the input vector. θ(v, t),
the neighbourhood function is dependent on the distance between the BMU and
neuron v. The SOM maps associate output nodes with groups or patterns in the
input data set. One single neuron wins whose weight vector is closest to the input
vector. SOM does not use a threshold value but rather selects a winning output
neuron when a pattern is entered. In general, Neural Networks are trained in a
supervised mode, but the SOMs are trained in an unsupervised mode. Neural
network can only be applied to certain types of problems i.e. it takes values
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between −1 and +1 and the inputs are within the range. SOM’s inputs are
normalised either with Multiplicative Normalisation or Z-axis normalisation [50].
5.1.1 SOM’s training process
A initial higher learning rate results to a quicker training process because it
decays over time, but SOM may fail if it is too high. This is because the random
movements of the weight vector exceed the allowed threshold for any pattern
to be determined. The other method is to use a relatively high learning rate
and reduce it as the training progresses. This trains the SOM very quickly at
the beginning and is then controlled while the training continues. SOM uses
the weighted connections between the input layer and the output layer as its
storage. With each iteration, the weights are calibrated. These calibrations
produce a SOM network that returns better results, when the same training data
is presented to it next time. More data is presented to SOM network as iterations
continue, and the weights are calibrated. But at some point the calibration stops
because the particular set of weights are no needed and at this point, the entire
matrix is reset to new random values, and a new learning cycle begins. The final
weight matrix is then taken as the best weight matrix from each of the cycles. As
mentioned before, the SOM trains in an unsupervised fashion and the output is
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Figure 5.1: Architecture for classifying webpages using unsupervised techniques
normally anticipated, but the expectation is that outputs new groups. Summing
up the above discussion, when SOM is applied to webpages, the process depicted
in Figure 5.1 is used. The webpages are first converted into feature vectors and
are then fed into SOM network which then produces a predictive model. This
predictive model is then used by each single webpage to place them into one of
the two categories i.e. safe/malicious.
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5.2 Datasets
For this thesis, DMOZ Open Directory Project [90] and Yahoo’s random URL
generator [91] have been used as the sources for safe webpages. For unsafe web-
pages, OpenDNS [92] and Spamscatter [93] have been used. From these sets of
webpages, the real-valued features in each feature has been normalised and lie be-
tween 0 and 1. Values outside this range in the testing set were converted to zero
or one as appropriate. The normalisation equalised the range of the features in
each feature set, both real-valued and binary. One further complication arose due
to undefined, or missing, features which were handled by using an extra binary
feature which defined to indicate whether the feature was defined.
5.3 Webpage clustering and WAC
Webpage clustering assigns webpages to a set of categories. Rather than trying
to simply assign webpages to pre-defined categories using a labelled set of data
for training, clustering algorithms discover distinct categories using an unlabelled
set of data. Webpages in the dataset are then assigned (often as a by-product of
the clustering process) to these newly discovered categories. Webpage clustering
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can be defined as following: a set of D of m webpages, denoted by d1....dm.
Each partitioned webpage is assigned to a soft partition in which each webpage
is probabilistically assigned to multiple clusters. Hard partitions can simply be
thought of as a case assigned to the single cluster for which it has the greatest
probability. The clustering task has two important components. The first is
determining how many clusters to partition the data into (i.e. choosing K). The
second is how to assign each webpage to these respective clusters.
WAC categorises a webpage into various clusters and thus will allow to classify
them as malicious or safe. The algorithm for the WAC system is shown in Figure
5.2. The next sections will look at how to parallelise SOM implementation.
5.4 How MapReduce works
MapReduce is a programming model used by Google [9] in many of its products.
Google has also developed an implementation for this model. This model takes
large amount of input and distributes the processing among huge numbers of
cheap computers. This allows it to complete processing within short period of
time compared to processing running on a single processor. But the implemen-
tation which deals with parallelising computations, distributing data and also
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Figure 5.2: Steps involved in the WAC tool.
tackling failures with hardware are quite complex and so an abstraction level has
been created in MapReduce. This abstraction layer reduces the complexity to
the developer.
MapReduce [84] is resistant to hardware failures which are normal for normal
workstations (without RAID support). Figure 5.3 shows the overall flow of a
MapReduce operation. A MapReduce program initially shards the input files
into M pieces (which is equivalent M map tasks) of typically 16 megabytes to 64
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Figure 5.3: Overall view of MapReduce. The master node assigns the workers
(also referred as nodes).
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megabytes per piece. It then starts up many copies of the program on a cluster
of machines. One of the copies is referred as master. The rest are workers that
are assigned work by the master. There are M map tasks and R reduce tasks to
assign. The master picks idle workers and assigns each one a map task or a reduce
task. A worker who is assigned a map task reads the contents of the corresponding
input shard. It parses key/value pairs out of the input data and passes each pair
to the user-defined Map function. The intermediate key/value pairs produced
by the Map function are buffered in memory. Periodically, the buffered pairs
are written to local disk, partitioned into R regions by the partitioning function.
The locations of these buffered pairs on the local disk are passed back to the
master, who is responsible for forwarding these locations to the reduce workers.
When a reduce worker is notified by the master about these locations, it uses
remote procedure calls to read the buffered data from the local disks of the map
workers. When a reduce worker has read all intermediate data, it sorts it by the
intermediate keys so that all occurrences of the same key are grouped together.
If the amount of intermediate data is too large to fit in memory, an external sort
is used.The reduce worker iterates over the sorted intermediate data and for each
unique intermediate key encountered, it passes the key and the corresponding set
of intermediate values to the user’s Reduce function. The output of the Reduce
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function is appended to a final output file for this reduce partition. When all
map tasks and reduce tasks have been completed, the master wakes up the user
program. At this point, the MapReduce call in the user program returns back to
the user code.
5.5 Hadoop
Hadoop is based on HDFS (Hadoop File System) and the implementation takes
ideas from Google File System [94]. It has been used in large organisations such
as Facebook [95], Twitter [96], Linkedin [93] etc. This is a distributed file system
for applications that use computationally intensive applications and works with
large amounts of data. This file system is extensively used by Google as the
primary storage mechanism.
5.6 Beowulf cluster and its problems
This Beowulf cluster implementation is a parallel computation model used only
on Linux based machines [97]. Any programs written and then run on a cluster
usually runs faster. But the program has to take care of the hardware failures and
the parallelism involved in the cluster. There is no room for fault-tolerance, error
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detection and work restart capabilities. This is probably a good solution for time-
boxed applications that demands reliable and timely execution of a particular
task e.g. finds the Euclidean distance between two points. Moreover this cluster
does not consider manageability which forces the programmer to manage each
resource separately in the cluster rather than a single file system. Firstly, the
parallel applications under a Beowulf cluster use message passing model rather
than shared memory. Secondly, Beowulf cluster focuses on developers and does
not take architectural model, testing and binary compatibility into account. This
leads to writing the application possibly being written again to take advantage of
clustering in order to make any significant changes to the program. And lastly,
the developer is often responsible for system design and administration, which
takes time and energy away from work on the actual application.
5.7 The chosen solution
Comparing the two algorithms, MapReduce has an upper hand in terms of par-
allelism. One of the downside of MapReduce is that it restricts the programming
model. But the counter argument is that it provides a good model for manag-
ing problems dealing with large datasets. And in particular problem with large
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Figure 5.4: WAC implementation incorporating Map and Reduce
datasets, MapReduce provides fast execution without worrying about the un-
derlying hardware infrastructure and rather are focused on the application i.e.
solving the problem. Based on these facts mentioned in [98] it has been decided
to use Hadoop which is a similar implementation to [84].
WAC has used SOM algorithm at first but in order to take advantage of the
MapReduce, the algorithm had to be revised slightly. No changes have been made
to the algorithm, but the way the calculations have been done has changed. An
intermediate step has been added which acts as a buffer has been used. This
buffer allows the system to be run the computation in parallel.
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The main strength of the WAC system is that no matter how many webpages
are in a website, each page is assigned a tag (see Figure 5.4 for WAC’s architec-
ture). Tags are used in blogs, forums, pictures and videos on-line for identifying
and grouping of the similar content. Also, the distribution content inside the web-
pages of a website is vividly clear to the user as the topographic map represents
‘concentration’ and ‘hollowness’.
5.8 Results
WAC consists of various tools which have been built . These tools have been
integrated so that the product produces the output as a SOM. The reason WAC
was designed with various tools is because it is easier to test the system separately
and find bugs in the system separately. WAC consists of:
1. Crawler: This tool downloads all the webpages from a target webpage and
stores the files in the local file system. This is done using a crawler that
‘visit and downloads’ the home page of the target webpage and retrieves all
the links. Then the crawler repeats the same process i.e. downloads all the
webpages referred by the links and so on. A list of the ‘crawled webpages’
is maintained so that the same is Webpage is not downloaded twice.
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2. HTML Parser: Generally, HTML pages have tags around each element
which are not necessarily part of the original content, and are not meant
for users but for web browsers. These browsers use these tags to understand
the layout and the formatting of the content. After the HTML Pages have
been downloaded from the Web, the webpages are parsed using this tool.
Parsing involves removing the tags from the HTML pages and retrieve text
that is understandable and readable to a normal user.
3. SOM Creator: This is the heart of the WAC system and creates the SOM
based on the techniques mentioned in [88] apart from the use of search. This
creates a SOM which the users can browse where tags are tags are attached
to the map at place of higher concentration of documents or commonly
known as clusters.
4. SOM Displayer: This tool displays the SOM on a grid that allows user
to click on nodes and the documents assigned to the node are shown. As
the clicks on one of the link, a Web Browser opens showing the Webpage
connected by the hyperlink.
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Class Use
Mapper This class takes an input pair of values and
produces an intermediate key/value pairs. The
programming model groups the values and for-
wards the values to the reduce class.
Reducer This class receives the intermediate values to a
corresponding intermediate key. Generally, one
or none output is produced per reduce method
call. Sometimes the computer’s main memory
is not enough for large datasets. So an iterator
is used instead for easy handling.
Driver This class is the main program that contains
the main method of the program. It sets the
input and output folders and the configurations
needed for jobs to run.
Table 5.1: Description of MapReduce Classes
5.8.1 Java Classes
The design of the implementation is composed of three classes i.e. Mapper,
Reduce and the Driver classes. See Table 5.1 for more details. At the end of the
job run, the results are aggregated by the reduce class and are used to display the
final SOM. The same program can be theoretically run on many machines without
any modification to the program and the test results demonstrate it clearly.
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5.8.2 Software
The system has been implemented using the Java Programming Language [99].
Data has been downloaded from websites by the crawler (part of WAC) and the
pages have been stored in the File System. The creation of SOM has been ac-
celerated by using MapReduce. The algorithm used four machines. Each system
consisted of 2 GHz processor and 2GB of RAM. The systems in cluster were
networked using 100 Mbps Ethernet links. Table 5.2 shows how the implemen-
tations compare with the increasing number of nodes. The MapReduce model is
used where the number of nodes is more than 1. Figure 5.5 shows the trend as
the number of nodes increases. The system is faster than earlier implementation
on a single processor and is now more scalable. Compared to Beowulf cluster,
the system is more easily manageable and usable. Beowulf has the disadvantage
of providing wrong results if one of the machines breaks down. On the other
hand WAC also has the advantage of being interoperable in various operating
systems as the system itself is written with Java. So, as long as the machine
has a Java virtual machine, the WAC tool can operate without any problems on
any Operating System. [84] has used MapReduce with great success at [9] and
the success has been rediscovered in WAC as well with the revised ‘MapReduced
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Number of
Nodes Webpages Time to com-
plete the test
Performance
improvement
1 979 292 N/A
2 979 284 ≈ 2%
3 979 261 ≈ 18%
4 979 244 ≈ 19%
Table 5.2: Results for SOM
SOM algorithm’. The algorithm has been used as part of WAC, which now takes
less time for categorisation.
5.9 Results from all the unsupervised techniques
Going back to the last Chapter, the same webpages are now fed into some un-
supervised machine learning techniques i.e. Mini Batch K-Means, K-Means and
Affinity Propagation. Figures 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 show that the three unsupervised
machine learning techniques clearly separate the malicious and safe webpages.
The parameters for the Affinity Propagation had to be readjusted to get the de-
sired number of clusters. Table 5.3 shows the results of the simulations. The table
uses silhouette coefficient as the main factor to determine the effectiveness of the
unsupervised algorithms. Silhouette coefficient (which can take values between -1
and +1) is a useful measure that combines the ideas of cohesion and separation.
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Figure 5.5: Chart shows the improvements.
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In general, a good classification will have higher separation and lower cohesion
which corresponds to silhouette coefficient being close to 1. It is clearly under-
standable that Affinity Propagation performs the best out of all the unsupervised
machine learning techniques because the silhouette coefficient is closest to 1 in
its case. The other two unsupervised machine learning techniques performed well
and are very similar in performance when are compared to each other. The Mini
Batch K-Means used less time and memory than its counterpart K-Means but
still achieved the same accuracy. This is important in a practical context where
resources such as CPU time and memory are limited. This can become a serious
issue when there are large amounts of data involved. The issue with the unsuper-
vised machine learning techniques that the results can vary and is not something
that can be relied upon yet when compared to the supervised machine learning
techniques as discussed in the previous Chapter.
5.10 Combined use of supervised and unsuper-
vised machine learning techniques
The last Chapter showed the use of supervised techniques and it was decided
to use the two techniques together to determine the malicious webpages. The
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Table 5.3: Results of comparisons of unsupervised machine learning techniques
that detect malicious webpages
Classifier Silhouette Coefficient
Mini Batch K-Means 0.877
Affinity Propagation 0.963
K-Means 0.877
images of the webpages were clustered using unsupervised techniques and then
fed into the models. Surprisingly, the efficiency did improve by a few percent.
5.11 Summary
The unsupervised techniques have shown that they are not far away from the
supervised techniques and are good enough at classifying webpages. Also, the
combination of both the supervised and the unsupervised techniques improved
the efficiency of the models. This Chapter has also showed that the performance
of machine learning techniques can be improved using multiple machines.
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Figure 5.6: Visual representation of Mini Batch K-Means model shows clear
boundaries between malicious and safe webpages
Figure 5.7: Visual representation of Affinity Propagation model shows clear
boundaries between malicious and safe webpages. The red dots are outliers.
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Figure 5.8: Visual representation of K-Means model shows clear boundaries be-
tween malicious and safe webpages
CHAPTER 6
Discussion and future work
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The past two decades have radically changed the modern life, especially due to
the fact that webpages have become an essential part of daily life. Webpages
have become a vital and convenient way for people to conduct business, gather
new information, discover new worlds and perform many other functions via
desktops, tablets and smartphones which all have one thing in common - browsers
to view webpages. The convenience of the Internet has a dramatic impact in
improving the lives yet also left the users exposed to malicious webpages. The
Internet does not have the quintessential properties found in the physical world
to assess any webpages and lacks rules that are present in organisations such
as banks and governments. Malicious attackers have benefitted from this and
now a click to a malicious webpage’s URL is enough to lead users to harm. The
research community has dealt these threats by developing blacklisting services
that compile a list of ‘malicious’ websites and also built client-side systems that
analyse webpages as they are visited. These services are helpful, but are only
useful for detecting known threats and fails to keep up with boundless stream of
new malicious websites. Client-side systems are slow and may accidentally expose
their users to threats. Not only are they available on browsers but webpages are
also used largely inside mobile applications either in IOS, Android or Windows
Mobile operating systems. As a result, the applications are now vulnerable to
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these diversified attacks. To address the limitations of existing approaches, this
thesis has developed an approach that is realtime, accurate, scalable and fast.
6.1 Contribution to knowledge
The central finding of this thesis is that machine learning techniques can alleviate
the disadvantages of blacklists and heavyweight & lightweight classifiers. This
has been achieved by constructing a realtime, accurate, middleweight and fast
classification system. Before, malicious webpage detection generally used super-
vised and batch machine learning techniques. However, this thesis demonstrated
that the approach of using a larger feature set especially the visual features had
clear advantages over fewer feature sets. Moreover, the thesis demonstrated the
benefits of online learning over standard batch learning for malicious URL detec-
tion (see Chapter 4). Online learning overcame the limitations of batch learning
because of its ability to process large-scale data sets with fewer computational
resources and to incorporate fresh training data incrementally. The thesis con-
structed a system for real-time feature collection, classification and showed the
supervised and unsupervised classification techniques can work together to build
better classifiers. In a future where there will be more data, the results from the
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thesis demonstrated that scalable and adaptive detection is feasible, representing
a significant advance over previous work.
One of the major contributions of this thesis was to explore a range of machine
learning technique that used a wide range of features and the use of unsupervised
machine learning techniques. The simulations show that a classifier can mine in-
formation contained in the URL, links, content and visual features from webpages.
Beyond URL features, the most significant drops in error rates were obtained from
the SURF visual features. The SURF visual features are more expensive to com-
pute, but the SURF features provide a way to include visual information without
a huge computational cost. Simulations on an up-to-date URL feed illustrate that
the proposed approach can identify malicious webpages at about 98% accuracy
and silhouette coefficient of up to 0.97. The features considered from webpage
content more than halve the error rate that is obtained from URL features alone.
The level of performance worsens but does not significantly deteriorate on un-
balanced data sets with different ratios of malicious and safe webpages. It is
interesting to see that the unsupervised machine learning techniques performed
very well in their performance despite the fact that they do not have access to
the class information about the data. This is an encouraging sign that perhaps
in the future, they will overtake supervised machine learning techniques through
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Deep Learning methods. This will have huge repercussions because there will be
very less time involved in the training phase and data labelling. The classifiers
will get close to decision making similar to human brains.
One of the major success of this thesis is improving the performance of the
classifiers through the use of multicore and multiple machines. The Chapter on
unsupervised algorithms demonstrates that the multi machine machine approach
do indeed improve the run time of the classifiers. MapReduce proved to be a very
worthy option when dealing with multi machine approach.
The final significant contribution of this thesis is the use of Chrome extension
in the browser. This allows to detect whether a webpage is malicious or not very
quickly often under a second. The lightweight classifiers are very fast but are less
accurate whereas heavyweight classifiers are more accurate but take more time.
This extension enables the classifier to be ‘middleweight’ with very high accuracy
and yet less prediction time. This has the advantages of both the lightweight
and the heavyweight classifiers. Chrome which is now becoming one of the most
popular browsers in the market, has a large reach to the users in the world and this
extension will certainly enable users feel more secure about browsing webpages.
The indicator next to the address bar in the Chrome browser indicates to the
user whether the webpage is malicious or not. The user can immediately decide
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to act on the information.
The thesis has dealt with various types of malicious activities and it did not
categorise the malicious activities. This caters for new malicious activities i.e.
when they appear the models will categorise them.
6.2 Limitations
There are few limitations in this thesis, one of which is that malicious webpages
are affected outside of features that have used in this thesis. In some cases, they
can get affected with a combination of features. This thesis uses classification ac-
curacy as the sole indicator. Despite these limitations, the thesis’s contribution is
encouraging: there are improved accuracy through additional features i.e. visual
features. A further improvement would be to improve the execution time for clas-
sifying the webpages using GPU [84] and MapReduce [98]. Latest devices have
access to GPUs, and this will improve the classification time. An extensive look
at Deep Learning is needed in the future that will essentially detect webpages as
malicious or not.
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6.3 Future Work
This thesis opens up many areas for further research. To succeed, the approach
of the thesis to malicious webpage relies heavily on features and large sources of
training data. There are a number of ways to expand the work of this thesis, few
of which are mentioned in the sections below.
More broadly, research is needed to determine other features of webpages
automatically. Deep Learning [100] would be one possible solution. Realisti-
cally, Deep Learning is only part of the larger challenge of building intelligent
machines. But Deep learning cannot represent causal relationships or perform
logical inferences or integrate abstract knowledge. It can play a part in Bayesian
inference or deductive reasoning. At present, the approach to detecting mali-
cious webpages relies on a source of labeled examples. Instead, is it possible to
use Deep Learning to build features and build a classifier to be used by already
built Chrome extension. However, trusting the Deep Learning technique presents
interesting challenges. Addressing these challenges would empower blacklisting
without building the features which takes huge amount of time. The findings of
this thesis have a number of important implications for future practice.
One improvement would be to move the classifiers to the browser and write
6.3. Future Work 139
them in JavaScript, because the and GPUs are becoming powerful day by day.
Browsers on the phones are now becoming more popular [101] and in the near
future it would be possible to build the extension for mobile users as well. An-
other area to look at would be to construct the machine learning models within
the Chrome browser using JavaScript. This is not possible at present because
JavaScript is interpreted and the performance of the machine learning models
will be painfully slow. But Chrome has a compiled version of JavaScript which
runs on top of V8 [102]. This will make it a possibility in the future because
the performance of the compiled JavaScript will be significantly faster than the
interpreted versions. This would mean that the current implementation in thesis
of a separate classifiers and the browser will all integrate together. This will al-
low the browser to be a standalone executable. The users will have access to an
intelligent browser that will detect a malicious webpage on its own.
Looking ahead, it can be said that the combination of systems and machine
learning will play a very important role in future research challenges. With more
access to big data in the coming days it will be difficult to analyse it manually.
Machine learning provides a methodical way to understand and build models
from big data. Also, domain expertise and an understanding of limitations are
important in developing a machine learning approach to solve problems. There
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are two ways these solutions can work to detect malicious webpages. The first
being the centralised way where all the classifiers can stay at a centralised loca-
tion. The other option is that the classifiers will be stored in local computers and
mobile phones. This thesis, with its focus on detecting malicious webpages, can
cater both approaches and is thus a successful application of this insight.
CHAPTER 7
Conclusion
142
This thesis has looked at identifying malicious webpages in real time using various
second and third generation machine learning techniques, and has been success-
ful in providing a robust framework with a real working tool in achieving its
goal. The thesis set out to determine the effectiveness of several supervised and
unsupervised machine learning techniques that used various types of features
such as content, URL, links and screenshots from more than 100,000 webpages.
The supervised machine learning techniques did well compared to the unsuper-
vised machine learning techniques. But the unsupervised techniques were not
very far off and came very close. The results from the Chrome extension that
took advantage of the best classifier of the supervised machine learning tech-
niques, demonstrated that it has the advantages of both the heavyweight and the
lightweight classifiers. Moreover, it avoids the disadvantages of the heavyweight
and the lightweight classifiers. One of the most significant outcome from this
thesis is that the visual features played a very important role in single handedly
identifying a webpage to be either malicious or not. This is very significant and
paves the way for Deep Learning techniques to detect a webpage to be malicious
just like a human being.
The thesis also looked at improving the run time efficiency of the machine
learning techniques. It used the MapReduce programming model to improve the
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performance of the Self-Organising Map by distributing its execution over several
machines. This reduced its execution time and opened up the possibility to use
GPUs in the future.
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1. Comparing machine learning techniques to detect malicious webpages (Ex-
pert Systems with Applications, USA, 2014)
2. Clustering Web Pages using MapReduced SOM (Journal of Communication
and Computer, USA, May 2010)
3. Effective Web Technologies for a Web Design Agency (KTP Conference,
University of Brighton, 2010)
4. Using Machine Learning to Optimise the Performance and Security of Web
Applications (Third International Conference on Internet Technologies and
Applications, Glyndwr University, North Wales, 2009)
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The tables below have a summary of the used notation and abbreviations.
Symbol Meaning
θ Parameter vector.
θ Random parameter vector.
M Matrix.
[N × n] Dimensionality of a matrix with N rows
and n columns.
MT Transpose of the matrix M .
diag[m1, . . . ,mN ] Diagonal matrix with diagonal
[m1, . . . ,mN ]
M Random matrix.
θˆ Estimate of θ.
θˆ Estimator of θ.
τ Index in an iterative algorithm.
Table B.1: General Notation.
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Symbol Meaning
Ω Set of possible outcomes.
ω Outcome or elementary event.
E Set of possible events.
E Event.
Prob{E} Probability of the event E.
(Ω,E, P rob{·}) Probabilistic model of an simulation.
Z Domain of the random variable z.
P (z) Probability distribution of a discrete random vari-
able z. Also Pz(z).
F (z) = Probz ≤ z Distribution function of a continuous random vari-
able z. Also Fz(z).
p(z) Probability density of a continuous r.v.. Also pz(z).
E[z] Expected value of the random variable z.
Ex[z] =
∫
X
z(x, y)p(x)dx Expected value of the random variable z averaged
over x.
Var[z] Variance of the random variable z.
L(θ) Likelihood of a parameter θ.
l(θ) Log-Likelihood of a parameter θ.
lemp(θ) Empirical Log-likelihood of a parameter θ.
Table B.2: Probability Theory notation.
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Symbol Meaning
x Multidimensional input variable.
X ⊂ <n Input space.
y Multidimensional output variable.
Y ⊂ < Output space.
xi i
th realization of the random vector x.
f(x) Target regression function.
w Random noise variable.
zi = 〈xi, yi〉 Input-output sample: ith case in training set.
N Number of available samples.
DN = z1, z2, . . . , zN Training set.
Λ Class of hypothesis.
α Hypothesis parameter vector.
h(x, α) Hypothesis function.
Λs Hypothesis class of complexity s.
L(y, f(x, α)) Loss function.
R(α) Functional risk.
α0 arg minα∈ΛR(α).
Remp(α) Empirical functional risk.
αN arg minRemp(α).
GN Mean integrated squared error (MISE).
l Number of folds in cross-validation.
Gˆcv Cross-validation estimate of GN .
Gˆloo Leave-one-out estimate of GN .
Ntr Number of samples used for training in cross-validation.
Nts Number of samples used for test in cross-validation.
αiNtr i = 1, . . . , l Parameter which minimizes the empirical risk of DNtr .
D(i) Training set with the i
th sample set aside.
αN(i) Parameter which minimizes the empirical risk of D(i).
Gˆboot Bootstrap estimate of GN .
D∗N Bootstrap training set of size N generated by DN with
replacement.
Nb Number of bootstrap samples.
Table B.3: Learning Theory notation.
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Symbol Meaning
xij j
th element of vector xi.
Xij ij
th element of matrix X.
q Query point (point in the input space where a prediction is
required).
yˆq Prediction in the query point.
yˆ−ji Leave-one-out prediction in xi with the j
th sample set aside.
elooj = yj − yˆ−jj Leave-one-out error with the jth sample set aside.
K(·) Kernel function.
B Bandwidth.
β Linear coefficients vector.
βˆ Least-squares parameters vector.
βˆ−j Least-squares parameters vector with the jth sample set aside.
hj(x, α) j
th, j = 1, . . . ,m, local model in a modular architecture.
ρj Activation or basis function.
ηj S et of parameters of the activation function.
Table B.4: Data analysis notation.
Abbreviation Meaning
DT Decision Tree
KNN K-Nearest Neighbour
LDA Latent Discriminant Analysis
MAP Maximum a posteriori
MLE Maximum likelihood estimate
NB Na¨ıve bayes
QDA Quantitative Discriminant Analysis
RF Random Forest
ROC Receiving operating characteristic
SOM Self-Organising Map
SVM Support Vector Machine
Table B.5: List of abbreviations.
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